Work in progress: On the difference between jealousy and envy
June 22, 2009
My aim in this piece is to explore why it is that people, in general, seem to be more inclined to admit jealousy than they are to admit envy. Before we can proceed with what I take to be a novel explanation of this phenomenon, it is important to first distinguish between these two psychological states. Perhaps even before this, it will be necessary to establish that these states can, in fact, be regarded as distinct. After all, it would not be unreasonable for one who has not closely examined the nature of these states to assert that the only difference between them is the terms used to describe them – that is, that there might only be one psychological state being described by two different terms. An individual hoping to advance such an argument might list certain criteria that one must meet in order to be deemed jealous and make the subsequent claim that these criteria, and no other, should be similarly required in order for one to be deemed envious. In doing so, she would likely believe that she had provided sufficient reason to regard the states of jealousy and envy as one in the same. Her criteria might look like the following:
In order to be deemed jealous/envious one must:
(1) desire a particular object
(2) not currently possess said object
(3) observe that some other individual currently possesses said object
(4) experience discontent as a result of the observation mentioned in (3)
While these criteria seem sufficient – insofar as they, taken as a whole, express the general sum of experiences that would serve to explain one’s jealousy or envy – I cannot help but perceive the need for a particular clarification; namely, a precise specification of what is meant by the term ‘object.’ I view this specification as necessary as I believe that the fundamental difference between jealousy and envy lies in the nature of the desired object. In cases of jealousy, I would argue that the object of desire must be one that possesses the power of choice – that is, the object must have the ability to rationally deliberate between potential objects of its’ desire. Simply, the object of desire must be one that has the freedom to determine its’ own possessor and also, whether it will be possessed at all. Contrastingly, the object of desire that is referred to in cases of envy must be one that does not (and cannot) will its’ being possessed and is instead possessed, or not, solely as the result of some other’s will. To clarify:
In order to be deemed jealous one must:
(1) desire an x that has the capacity to rationally deliberate between, and subsequently pursue, objects of its’ own desire
(2) not currently possess x
(3) observe that some other individual, y, currently desires and possesses x
(4) observe that x desires y
(5) experience discontent as a result of the observations mentioned in (3) and (4)
In order to be deemed envious one must:
(1) desire an x that does not, itself, have the capacity to formulate its’ own desires
(2) not currently possess x
(3) observe that some other individual, y, currently desires and possesses x
(4) experience discontent as a result of the observation mentioned in (3)
Thus, we are able to distinguish between jealousy and envy as psychological states. At this point, it seems necessary that I make the caveat that I am not, in making the above distinction, attempting to make any sort of substantive claim about the practical semantics of the terms used to describe these psychological states. Rather, my intent is to forward an acceptable normative claim in regard to the use of these particular terms as correspondents to distinct psychological states. Simply, I accept that these terms are often used interchangeably, whilst simultaneously rejecting that they should be used so.
Please leave a comment or e-mail me and tell me what you think so far or if you have any useful criticisms.
